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Khameiel Al Tamimi’s paper addresses and tries to connect two topics that have recently become 
rather significant within contemporary argumentation studies: namely the exploration of the 
potential argumentative qualities of narrative discourse and the so called virtue theory of (or 
virtue approach to) argumentation. 
 Virtue theory of argumentation has been advocated by Daniel Cohen and Andrew 
Aberdein, and, more recently, by my Spanish colleague José Gascón. Al Tamimi claims that this 
kind of approach, especially if extended and supplemented by means of her own suggestion to 
take into account not only arguer’s virtues but also her audience’s, could provide a theoretical 
framework enabling us to address the evaluation of narrative arguments. A substantial part of her 
paper is therefore dedicated to the definition and characterization of the “virtuous audience” 
which, with an interactive spirit, is said to “essentially include both the arguer and interlocutor” –
perhaps, we could talk about “virtuous argumentative agents” in general.  
 Al Tamimi’s discussion of the “virtuous audience” assumes some basic and well-known 
ideas, typical of the rhetorical perspective in argumentation studies:  
 
- the process of joint construction (or co-authorship) of the produce of 
argumentation by arguer and audience (or, in general, by the interlocutors), 
theorized and advocated by Christopher Tindale, 
- the long-standing tradition of the expected adaptation of argumentative 
discourse to its concrete audience, 
- and the evaluative role assumed by that same audience in terms of the efficacy 
of   argumentation to achieve the arguer’s persuasive goal. 
 
But Al Tamimi is not very confident in the adequate outcome of such a court’s judgment. As we 
all know, real life audiences may be persuaded by (what some consider) not particularly good 
arguments and Al Tamimi is particularly worried that they be persuaded by “dangerous stories 
such as racist or misogynistic stories.” Her suggestion, which she somehow connects with 
Perelman’s concept of a “universal audience”, is the requirement that audiences should have (and 
cultivate) certain virtues in order to be better judges of argument (let aside for the moment their 
narrative nature). 
 I have a comment to make here, because, complex as it is, Perelman’s conception of a 
“universal audience” is not referred to any really existing audience, it does not characterize any 
empirical object. The “universal audience” is allegedly a pre-construction of the arguer who 
ideally (when trying to reach a certain level of excellence and rationality) will mold her 
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discourse as if it were addressed to a highly demanding audience of extremely rational, wise and 
educated people (call them virtuous or more specifically argumentatively virtuous, if you want).  
 Al Tamimi’s concept of a “virtuous audience”, I suggest, could work in the same way, 
encouraging an exploration (similar to those undertaken by Cohen and Aberdein) into the virtues 
that the arguer should assume her audience to have in order to help her construe a discourse fit 
and expectedly persuasive for the virtuous. But the paper does not suggest such a role in the 
arguer’s “invention”. It seems, instead, to be talking about real audiences and Al Tamimi’s fear 
that they would accept bad (or vicious) modes of arguing leads her to advocate the explicit 
“cultivation of virtues”, I understand by real people. But how is this done? Apparently, by 
engaging in “good argumentative practices”. However, it is not clear, now, where that “good” 
comes from: is it a virtuous good or does it correspond to any other standard? 
 I suspect there could be some amount of circularity in the whole approach. The cases that 
Al Tamimi repeatedly tries to avoid being deemed acceptable by real audiences (explicitly cases 
where racism or misogyny pervade the arguer’s discourse) are cases in which she has a strong 
conviction to have already chosen “the right side”. Our societies have come to certain 
agreements regarding these issues after long struggles and controversies; after engaging (among 
other things) in argumentative practices where a judgment against racism or misogyny, delivered 
by certain audiences with decisive (and influential) capacities, has been the final outcome. Those 
who do not accept such verdicts are already “social outcasts” in many fora and it is easy to 
classify their followers (somehow automatically) as non-virtuous.  
 But if we think about more controversial issues; issues in which we have not yet come to 
so wide an agreement (e.g. legalized prostitution or drugs, or certain biotechnological policies), 
we will have to trust in the due course of our struggles and argumentative practices. We will 
have to trust in the (always amendable) judgment of real arguers and multiple audiences and in 
the complex social process of opinion forming in various rhetorical settings. I’m not sure we can 
control that, somehow beforehand, by identifying a small set of virtues allegedly required of any 
agent taking part in any argumentative practice. 
 And coming now to the question of narrative argument, Khameiel Al Tamimi defines 
narrative argument “as a story told in the context of dissensus or disagreement.” She also adds 
that she is referring to oral, communicative and interactive practices, with several interlocutors 
involved. In such settings, I agree, there might be a strong presumption that the story (or 
narrative) in particular is being used as an argument, or part of an argument, or line of 
argumentation and is, therefore, pointing to an either implicit or explicit claim (or is somehow 
the claim itself).  
 I’m particularly interested in exploring how this happens in real dialogues, which are the 
conventional mechanisms to let the audience (or interlocutor) know about our intentions in 
telling a story and which are the most typical structures in which narratives appear with an 
argumentative role. I have elsewhere advanced the following preliminary classification of modes 
of narrative argument: 
 
1. Narrative-based explicit arguments 
a. Arguments based on parallel stories not directly related to and causally 
and historically independent from the circumstances referred to in the 
thesis or claim, which are, nevertheless, presented as reasons for its 
acceptance. 
b. Arguments in which the data, or part of the data, are presented in 
narrative form. 
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c. Arguments about narratives with (partly) narrative claims or 
conclusions. 
2. Credible (pure) narration as argumentative 
a. Arguing for its own veracity by means of its “manifest credibility”. 
b. Arguing for the credible characterization of an object (in general terms) 
or several objects of discourse (i.e. framing them, as the term is used in 
discourse analysis). 
 
Such argumentative resources – which are, moreover, extensively widespread in all kinds of 
argumentative settings and practices, undertaken by all kinds and ranks of people – deserve a 
place in argumentation theory, and I agree with Al Tamimi that some dominant accounts in our 
field have overlooked them. However, my own theoretical strategy is precisely to see them as 
not-so-different from other more currently assumed as argumentatively explicit and recognized 
resources. In that sense, narratives as arguments or part of arguments may call for distinct 
evaluative tools just as may any other particular argumentative means: from the whole category 
of visual arguments to any concrete argument scheme, i.e. any particular and peculiar kind of 
“reason” supporting a claim. 
If Al Tamimi’s idea of exploring the virtues of audiences in order to build an evaluative 
framework works, it will work, in my opinion, for any mode of arguing. If a rhetorical approach 
is needed in this case, it is because a rhetorical approach is needed (or at least adequate) in every 
argumentative case. Narratives, says Al Tamimi, cannot be “reduced to premises and 
conclusion.” I agree that the classical monological ideas about arguments reconstructed as 
abstract structures of premises (understood as independent and independently assessable 
statements) jointly and sufficiently supporting (and ideally implying) a conclusion, with all the 
traditional worries about finding “missing premises”, is not a very promising framework to 
account for what really happens in dialogical, interactive settings… whether these involve 
narratives or not. 
But this does not mean that we can dispense with studying the concrete way narratives 
become (or not) argumentative stuff: i.e. are being offered as reasons for something else (or 
eventually for their own credibility) or are being supported as justifiable claims by other kinds of 
reasons. All this happens in interactive argumentative practices where, I agree, the cooperation 
(or co-authorship) of the agents in building, understanding and improving or defeating the 
arguments (either by acquiescence or by objections, requests, counter or meta-arguments) and 
the micro and macro-processes of persuasion, definitely call for a rhetorical framework. 
In this sense, the relevant phenomenon is not exactly that the audience is the ultimate 
evaluator of argument just by being or not being persuaded (as this could still be understood in a 
too traditional, passive way). What really happens is that “argument evaluation” (narrative or 
not) is an argumentative practice in itself that already takes place in a continuum of 
argumentative exchanges between engaged interlocutors. Studying and understanding how this 
happens is one of our goals. If anyone wants to improve how it happens, let her join such 
ongoing practice. 
